The article was published in the historical and local history issue “Theological Spring” No. 9 for the newspaper “Karpinsky Rabochiy”. Karpinsk, October 25, 2016. P.4-6. VASILY AGAFONOV – PARTICIPANT RUSSIAN-JAPANESE WAR In 2014, in Russia, and not only, they celebrated 100 years since the beginning of the First World War. Then the newspaper “Karpinsky Rabochiy” collected information about the participants in this war. That same year marked 110 years since the beginning of another war – the Russo-Japanese War. Were there any theologians among the participants in this distant war? Working with, in the registry book for 1906, I came across the following entry: “On October 25, a driver from the rural inhabitants of the Bogoslovskaya volost, Vasily Stefanov Agafonov, Orthodox, first marriage, 28 years old, married to a rural man in the street, Ioann Grigoriev, Raeva, daughter Evgenia, Orthodox, first marriage, 19 years old. The guarantors for the groom were rural inhabitants: Mikhail Vasiliev Karavaev and Vasily Ioannov Agafonov; for the bride, rural inhabitants Ioann Ioannov Raev and Feodor Petrov Budakov.” I was interested in the Amur mine transport. The search began. And here's what we found out. The shipbuilding program of 1895 in Russia provided for the construction of two mine transports with a displacement of at least 2000 tons (450-500 mines each). They were intended not only for defensive, but also for active mine laying off enemy coasts. At their core, the designed ships were minelayers, but due to the absence of such a class in the Russian fleet, they were officially called “mine transports.” On March 15, 1898, the Baltic Shipyard received an order to build the first, and on April 17, the second ship, which were named “Amur” and “Yenisei”. During the winter-spring of 1900, outfitting work was intensively carried out on both ships in order to begin sea trials with the start of navigation. On January 5, the Amur steam engines were tested in the workshop of the Baltic Plant, and on February 10, the Yenisei steam engines, after which they were dismantled, loaded onto ships and installation began. The Yenisei began the campaign on October 24, 1900, and on October 31, the chief commander of the Kronstadt port, Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov, reported that the tests of laying mines from the Yenisei were completed and found satisfactory; on November 11, the transport ended the campaign. By the way, at the suggestion of the radio inventor A.S. Popov, the boatswain's cabin under the forecastle was converted into a radio room. On August 1, 1901, the highest review of the Yenisei took place, after which both transports began hastily preparing for the passage to Port Arthur. On August 15, “Amur” and “Yenisei” left Kronstadt for the Far East (commanded by captains 2nd rank V.L. Barshch and K.A. Grammatchikov). On March 6, 1902, the Amur arrived in Port Arthur, and the Yenisei arrived on the 22nd. On July 30, the head of the Pacific squadron, Vice Admiral N.I. Skrydlov, in a report, expressed his opinion about the arriving ships: “Both transports immediately began service upon joining the squadron and neither the vehicles nor the boilers required any corrections, which should be credited, both to the Baltic plant that built them, and to the personnel who made the transition from Russia to them.” On July 6, both transports completed the mine-laying campaign and entered the armed reserve. On June 12, 1903, the squadron headquarters developed a plan according to which the Talienvan Gulf was blocked with a minefield. Despite signs of an approaching war with Japan, transports were kept in reserve for a long time in order to save money. Only on January 18, 1904 did they begin the campaign and three days later they took part in the Port Arthur squadron going to sea. On the night of January 27, 1904, without a declaration of war, Japanese destroyers attacked the Russian squadron stationed on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. During the attack, the Yenisei was in the harbor, while the Amur, as a duty ship along with the squadron, was in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. Enemy torpedoes missed him, and in the morning he entered the Eastern Basin. On January 29, the Yenisei hit its own mine and sank. On January 30, the Amur transport was transferred from the squadron to the list of coastal defense vessels, and on February 3, it successfully laid 121 mines in Kerr and Deep bays, and on February 5, 99 mines in Talienwan Bay. At the insistence of the commandant of the fortress, it was decided to mine the Bay of Ten Ships with mines in order to prevent enemy troops from landing in the rear of the Kinjous position. For this purpose, on February 10, Rear Admiral M.F. Loschinsky went there on the Amur mine transport, where 20 mines were placed. On February 28, the Amur, accompanied by destroyers, went to sea to lay mines at the site from which Japanese ships were shelling the city and fortress. In an area 2-3 miles from Liaoteshan, 20 mines were successfully deployed. This was the end of Russian mine laying in the initial period of the war. 717 mines were laid in Talienwan Bay and nearby bays. On April 22, the Japanese 2nd Army began landing at Bidzywo. Japanese superiority at sea became overwhelming. In order to reduce land communications, the Japanese intend to move the landing closer to the target of the attack in Kerr Bay. But there were mines there, laid out by the Amur mine transport. On April 29, destroyer No. 48 touched a mine while trawling and sank 7 minutes after the explosion. In this case, six people were killed and 10 were injured. On May 1, the steam boat Miyako touched a missed Russian mine and sank 23 minutes later after an explosion. The explosion killed 2 sailors. After the destruction of destroyer No. 48 and the Miyako, mine sweeping work in Kerr Bay was stopped, and the Japanese abandoned the idea of ​​landing here. Starting from April 26, “Cupid” was ready for production. However, it was dangerous to go out at night because of Japanese destroyers, and during the day there were large enemy ships near Port Arthur. In addition, night staging did not guarantee accuracy. There was a chance to secretly place mines in the path of the Japanese blocking forces only if there was foggy weather for at least 3 hours. To cover the landing of troops, the main forces of the Japanese fleet began a close blockade of Port Arthur. It was noted that the Japanese blocking forces followed the same route every day. It was decided to take advantage of this. On May 1, "Amur" began setting mines. The transport miners worked flawlessly. All 50 minutes lined up well. The next day, May 2, the blockade at Port Arthur was supported by a detachment under the command of Admiral Nasib, consisting of the battleships Hatsuse, Shikishima, Yashima, the cruiser Kasagi and the advice note Tatsuta. Nearby were the cruisers Akashi, Suma, Chiyoda, Akitsushima, Takasago, gunboats Uji, Oshima, Akagi and destroyers. Some of them safely passed through the place where the Amur had laid mines the day before. At 1050 hours the battleship Hatsuse hit a mine. The explosion occurred in the stern, and as a result, the tiller compartment immediately flooded. Admiral Nasiba ordered the ships of his detachment to change course, but a few minutes later the battleship Yashima was blown up by a mine. The battleship received a hole on the starboard side; Not even a few moments passed before a second explosion followed. The admiral immediately sent the cruiser Takasago to the Yashima, and the Kasaga to the Hatsusa. "Kasagi" followed to "Hatsusa" to take it in tow, but at 1233 hours this battleship was blown up by another mine. Within one or two minutes, the battleship Hatsuse sank. In this case, 36 officers and conductors, 445 lower ranks and 12 civilian employees were killed. On the battleship Yashima, the crew fought for the survivability of the ship, but they could not stop the spread of water throughout the interior. It became clear that the ship was doomed. First, the portrait of the emperor was solemnly transported to the cruiser "Suma", and then the crew was lined up on the quarterdeck. To the sounds of the national anthem and three times “banzai”, the flag was lowered, after which the crew left the battleship in an orderly manner, which sank some time later. The death of one Japanese battleship and the explosion of the second were so unexpected for the Russian command that they were unable to develop and consolidate it by attacking the remaining ships. During the entire period of metal shipbuilding, neither before nor after the Russo-Japanese War, the Russians failed to sink a single enemy battleship on the high seas. The loss of two of the six (one third) ironclads of the Japanese fleet was a remarkable success. It seemed that all was not lost, and the course of the war at sea, and therefore on land, could be turned around. The personnel of the squadron in Port Arthur perked up. Moreover, at the beginning of May the Japanese suffered other losses - also from mines. On May 4, the Japanese destroyer Akatsuki was 8 miles from Liaoteshan, where it touched a mine and sank after an explosion. Commander S. Naojiro, 6 officers and conductors, and 16 sailors were killed. The Akatsuki was probably killed by mines laid by the Amur mine transport. On May 10, the Amur was engaged in trawling (detonating mines) in the roadstead. On the night of May 14, Russian troops left the city of Dalniy and retreated to Port Arthur. On this day, the squadron command decided to lay mines in Takhe Bay to prevent shelling from the sea on the flanks of the fortress defense. “Amur” went to sea and the production of 49 minutes was successful. On May 17, 1904, Rear Admiral Vitgeft ordered to remove all 75-mm cannons from the Amur and transfer them to the squadron battleship Tsesarevich, which was completing repairs. On May 22, “Amur” went to sea for another 50-minute deployment near Golubina Bay. V.K. Vitgeft considered this production to be the last for “Amur”, since the stock of mines on transport was running out. There was nothing left to lay large minefields, and because of small minefields it was not worth risking such a valuable ship. But, having stumbled upon mines, we had to return to the harbor. On June 2, the squadron commander ordered the Amur commander to clear the fairway himself to ensure access to laying mines. In Golubina Bay, a minelayer received an underwater hole from hitting a rock. As a result, five double-bottom compartments and three coal pits were flooded. The mine transport was not repaired due to the lack of mines in Port Arthur, and later it was used as a minesweeping base. The personnel were engaged in the manufacture and repair of trawls, participated in trawling, construction of fortifications and battles on the land front. On November 26, 1904, the Amur was sunk in the dock by artillery fire. On December 20, the ship was blown up by the crew before the fall of the fortress. On June 22, the Japanese gunboat (coastal defense ship) Kaimon was providing mine action in Tungkau Bay, where it hit a mine and sank. 22 people died. The cause of the death of this ship was a mine laid by the Yenisei or Amur. The minefields laid by the transports delayed the start of the Japanese exploitation of the Dalny port, did not allow them to land troops behind the Russian troops, limited shelling from the sea of ​​forts, the city and the port, and made a close blockade of the Kwantung Peninsula impossible. The mine threat narrowed the operational space of the Japanese fleet, led to serious losses, and forced the enemy to waste time and effort on mine action. Of the 1066 mines laid by Russian ships at Port Arthur, 837 (78.5%) fell on the Amur and Yenisei.

Rear Admiral Vitgeft appealed to the Commander-in-Chief with a request to award the commander of the Amur with a golden saber “For Bravery”, reward seven officers and allocate 20 insignia of the military order for the lower ranks. The governor not only approved all the proposals of the squadron commander, but also awarded some officers higher awards than requested. But instead of 20, the lower ranks were given only 12 St. George Crosses. All participants in the war with the Japanese in the East were awarded medals “In memory of the Russian-Japanese War.” The medal had three types. Silver was awarded to participants in the defense of Port Arthur, light bronze was awarded to all direct participants in the war, and dark bronze was awarded to those who did not take part in the battles, but were in service in the Far East. Probably, Vasily Stepanovich Agafonov was awarded a silver medal as a participant in the defense of Port Arthur. Unfortunately, nothing is known about his life yet. But perhaps the descendants of Vasily Stepanovich and Evgenia Ivanovna Agafonov still live in Karpinsk. Maybe they still have family photographs with the image of Vasily Stepanovich, information about him, and even a medal, like a family heirloom. Of course, everyone has heard about the legendary cruiser “Varyag”, but it turns out that the minelayer “Amur”, on which our fellow countryman Vasily Stepanovich Agafonov, a participant in the events described above, served, was no less legendary. Mikhail Bessonov, historian-archivist

Business card
Rear Admiral Valery Nikolaevich Agafonov was born in the Oryol region in 1956. In 1978, he graduated with honors from the Caspian Higher Naval Red Banner School named after S.M. Kirov, specialty: engineer-navigator. He began his service in the Northern Fleet as the commander of the electronic navigation group of the navigational combat unit of a nuclear submarine. In the submarine he held all the key positions up to deputy commander of the nuclear submarine flotilla. Now he is the head of the combat training department of the Northern Fleet.
Rear Admiral Valery Agafonov has fourteen autonomous voyages under his belt: under polar ice, in the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. He was awarded the Order of Courage, “For Personal Courage”, “For Military Merit”, the Medal “For Military Merit” and other state awards.

Comrade Rear Admiral, they say that as you spend the old year, you will get down to business in the new one with the same mood. Therefore, knowing about the recent success of the North Sea sailors, we can say that the sailors started the winter training period with a “spark”?
- Undoubtedly. According to the results of the past year, the Northern Fleet won ten of the twenty-two prizes of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for types of combat training. So our mood is more than high. And the honor bestowed upon the fleet requires us not to rest on our laurels, but to roll up our sleeves and, from the very first day of the winter training period, seriously begin to further improve our professionalism.
- After the completion of the organizational period, the “flywheel” of combat training in the Northern Fleet is gaining its usual momentum and is already entering a given rhythm. What are the plans of the North Sea residents in the new academic year?
- Combat training always begins with the completion of the first course tasks by ship crews. By the end of the winter training period, we will have practiced the actions of homogeneous groupings of naval forces, in particular, ship strike groups and ship search strike groups. Long-distance voyages to different areas of the World Ocean are also planned for submarines and surface ships. Perhaps the North Sea residents will have to make several visits to foreign ports. True, their schedule is still being agreed upon by the Russian Foreign Ministry. And upon completion of the summer training period, we will conduct a gathering-campaign of heterogeneous fleet forces and perform combat exercises. We hope that by this time repairs will be completed on a number of surface ships and nuclear submarines and they will become part of the permanent readiness forces.
Next year, the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov will finally leave the shipyard and take part in the naval parade on the occasion of Navy Day and the 70th anniversary of the Northern Fleet. He will come to the Severomorsk roadstead under his own power. By the way, the aircraft carrier faces serious tasks for the second half of the academic year: it will work with carrier-based aircraft, as they say, according to the full scheme.
We continue to help the “industry” launch domestic and foreign weather and communications satellites into a given altitude or low-Earth orbit. That is why it is now planned to fire ballistic missiles from the boards of strategic submarines both for combat training and in the interests of science.
- The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the Commander of the Northern Fleet declared the new academic year “a year of increasing the level of professional training”...
- And therefore, the main task for all levels of the naval “vertical” is not to improve, as happened before, the methodology for conducting classes in the specialty, which has already been worked out for decades and completely suits us. This year we will pay more attention not to the number of events, but to the quality of their implementation, which depends primarily on the level of special training of personnel, the state of equipment and weapons. And we must not make the mistakes that happened last school year this year. By the way, there were no serious mistakes associated with accidents or breakdowns of military equipment. There were minor shortcomings in the combat training plans and the algorithm for conducting classes or exercises. And, unfortunately, there is no escape from this. As you know, only those who do nothing make no mistakes.
By the way, the naval training and material base allows for effective combat training. For example, today, with the help of simulators at the Northern Fleet training center, we can not only create a tactical background for the actions of one ship or a group of ships, but also simulate a situation for practicing operational tasks, bringing them as close as possible to real operations at sea. And in Zaozersk, where the nuclear submarine squadron is stationed, officers and midshipmen of the local training center themselves developed an excellent “Western Face” simulator. On it, submarine crews practice a lot of combat training tasks, including, in particular, repelling an attack by surface ships, observing safety measures when a nuclear-powered submarine goes out to sea, and so on.
- Valery Nikolaevich, what problems plagued the Northern Fleet last year and will they arise again? For example, regarding fuel...
- The North Sea residents did not have any acute fuel problems as such: we met the limits allotted to us. If they cut them for us next year, difficulties will, of course, arise. And above all, with ships going to sea and aviation flights. However, we expect that there will be even more fuel.
Our main problem is the staffing of the fleet with conscript personnel. We are not particularly pleased with both the number of conscripts and the quality of their general educational training. Therefore, the Northern Fleet command is trying to transfer the crewing of the TAVKR Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov, TARKR Peter the Great, and nuclear submarines to a contract basis. But this is a complex question, and not even on a naval, but on a national scale. Since we are not ready to recruit the required number of contract soldiers, and even on a competitive basis. Cause? It is objective: the salary of military personnel serving under contract in the positions of sailors and petty officers has never reached a level after which we would be besieged by crowds of those who want it. Of course, we promote the prestige of naval service in the media and send requests to military registration and enlistment offices. We are waiting for the result. But again: without increasing the pay for this category of military personnel, all our expectations will be in vain.
- In recent years, I have heard complaints about the professional training of lieutenants and graduates of higher naval schools. However, not only that: upon joining the fleet, young officers simply wrote reports for transfer to the reserve...
- This year, compared to previous times, the number of those unwilling to serve has decreased several times. Why? The lieutenant, having joined the fleet, sees that his salary after the July increase is sufficient in its level, and he no longer has the thought of looking for a new job. And a junior officer now receives about ten thousand, guaranteed, with virtually no interruptions or delays. And the fact that civilians have two days off a week, we try not to offend our people: if there are tasks, we work, if not, we set a normal working day.
However, it is not yet possible to say that lieutenants come with training that would completely satisfy us. And not because young officers are so bad in themselves. It is difficult to teach a cadet how to operate modern technology using a poster. Therefore, a lot here depends on financing the renovation of the material base of schools. Although some lieutenants come with a wealth of knowledge that allows them to quickly master real ship technology and pass tests for admission to independent command of a unit.
- Last year, in the Northern Fleet, two flotillas of nuclear submarines became squadrons. Are we cutting back again?
- No. It’s just that the composition of the associations did not correspond to the flotillas. There are no new ships, but the boats are still put into reserve. Due to the change in the number of permanent readiness forces, a kind of restructuring took place.
- Is the reserve in case of military operations, when we will not build a new boat, but restore the technical readiness of the old one?
- Yes. It takes up to six months to build a new nuclear-powered submarine, and from the reserve, the same factories commission ten nuclear submarines into the permanent readiness forces. It is no secret that boats are put into reserve due to the condition of their equipment. We cannot send people to sea on ships on which, due to financial problems in the state, mid-term repairs have not been carried out or are overdue, and so on. No one will simply give us such a right. There are reserves of different categories: one category has a slightly reduced crew, another category has a more reduced crew. But none of the submariners were written off or left behind in the naval service. We do not have enough specialists, we are trying our best to save them.
By the way, today the staffing of the permanent readiness forces with officers is 100 percent. And this is precisely due to the fact that the boat, for example, goes into reserve, and the officers from it are transferred to other ships.
- Will North Sea residents expect any more global “restructuring” this academic year?
- In general, except for minor touches, no major “perestroika” is expected. Unless the question arises of laying off literally a few dozen people. Therefore, it can be argued that we have approached the structure of the fleet that they want to see from us in terms of general reform of the Armed Forces. But this is this year. And what will happen next? It's hard to say. To maintain the Northern Fleet in its current “shape”, it is necessary that the outflow and influx of ships into its composition be the same.
- There has been talk for several years about transferring the naval units of the Arctic Regional Directorate of the FPS to the fleet...
- This issue has been under consideration for three or four years. However, the activities of maritime border guards are closer to the specifics of the border service as a whole. I believe that if necessary, we will all have them and will carry out tasks in the interests of the fleet. Because what kind of border protection is there if the question arises about the fate of the state itself? But when the fleet operates in peacetime, their tasks do not coincide with ours. It’s nonsense if the North Sea people start catching poachers again. It's a different matter when it comes to joint actions.
Working out interaction is a serious issue that we pay more and more attention to every year. In the coming academic year, as in 2002, we will once again involve both border guards and ships of the Murmansk Shipping Company, which in case of hostilities from “civilian” ones should turn, for example, into minesweepers with military crews, to participate in the gathering. . And now, I believe, there is no need for the Northern Fleet to take on non-specific functions.

Agafonov Vitaly Naumovich. Captain 1st rank. Commander of a brigade of diesel submarines, those that took part in the campaign against Cuba (Cubic Crisis). The interview was taken in 2001 during the preparation of the film “Russian Depth”

(Photos from the personal archive of V.N. Agafonov)

Why were diesel submarines sent to the conflict zone?

Diesel submarines were sent to the conflict zone as the most prepared for this campaign. It was decided by the commander of the Northern Fleet not to send other submarines. Why?

Because nuclear submarines were just coming into operation. There were many problems with the equipment, and in 1961 the only submarine, K-19, suffered an accident. Other submarines entering service, including torpedo submarines, also had many malfunctions.

A decision was made, but there were no other boats. Then, in the autumn of 1961, submarine 211 of the brigade from the 4th squadron - 4 submarines - began preparations, essentially. As far as I know, no other submarines were being prepared for this voyage.

And you were appointed to command the submarines that were heading towards Cuba?

I was in a very difficult situation. With me exactly... Captain 1st Rank Evseev Ivan Aleksandrovich was appointed commander of the 69th brigade. This is the former chief of staff of the fourth submarine squadron. And in 1962 he received the rank of rear admiral, and was appointed commander of the campaign on the Kama theme, as it was then called. “Kama” is one of the sub-themes of Operation Anadyr, which was preparing for the events that awaited us in 1962.

What did you know about the events taking place there?

Unfortunately. Apart from some guesswork, we didn’t know anything official about it. Nowhere in the press, television, or cinema was anything said about the complicating situation around Cuba, and between the USA and the USSR. Moreover, even when we were sent on this campaign, we were told that the 4th submarines of the 69th brigade submarines SF B-4, B-36, B-59, B-130 (the commanders were captain 2nd rank Ketov Rurik Aleksandrovich, captain 2nd rank Dubivko Alexey Fedoseevich, captain 2nd rank Sovitsky Valentin Grigorievich, captain 2nd Shumkov Nikolay Aleksandrovich), we were told that these submarines would have to fulfill the task of the Soviet Government to secretly pass through the ocean, to one of the friendly countries for further basing in this country.

Moreover, we knew neither the base point nor the route. All documents were secretly developed in Moscow at the General Staff of the Navy and, apparently, at the General Staff.

We were given the documents immediately before the hike. I was handed a large package, a stack sealed with the seal of the Main Headquarters of the Navy in Moscow - “commander of the 69th brigade” and there a separate package was prepared for each submarine, also marked “top secret”. Moreover, these packages were issued several hours before departure, and they were allowed to be opened only at sea.

Were there nuclear weapons on board, and what were the guidelines for their use?

Yes it was. Each submarine loaded one torpedo with a nuclear weapon. No specific directives were given on this issue. But there were documents in the fleet, and it was clear to us who could give the order to use it. Only Moscow, the Minister of Defense, could give this order.

Did any of the commanders have experience using nuclear weapons?

Only one commander had experience in using nuclear weapons; he had shooting experience. In 1961, near the island of Novaya Zemlya, at that test site, high-power nuclear weapons were tested, submarines, surface ships, and aircraft participated.

The submarine B-130, commander captain 2nd rank Nikolai Aleksandrovich Shumkov, fired two shots, both very successfully, and the boat was not damaged in the flames of the explosion, and the commander was then awarded the Order of Lenin.

The rest of the submarines had no experience in the use of nuclear weapons, but on each submarine, according to the training course, tasks on the use of nuclear weapons were practiced. The commanders and the entire crew of the submarine received very good training in studying nuclear weapons and methods of handling them. Numerous training sessions were conducted on loading and unloading torpedoes with nuclear warheads.

Was there any fear or hesitation about the use of nuclear weapons?

We, as submarine commanders and personnel, were brought up in the spirit that we must use the weapons we had to defend the Motherland. I understood it this way, and I think that other boat commanders and personnel understood it this way. Of course, we had no fear or doubt. And the very experience of the B-130 commander firing two torpedoes showed that commanders and personnel are ready to use nuclear weapons. Of course, on this campaign we were ready if we received such an order. You understand that, fortunately, this global fire did not break out and the Caribbean conflict was resolved by politicians. Reason prevailed over this element, which threatened the destruction of the whole world.

After you took the boat to the center of Catherine Bay, was there now fear from the realization that there were nuclear weapons on board?

No. I want to say that in general we were brought up on the experience of the Great Patriotic War, communicated with the heroes of that war, and talk about any kind of fear. We went on that trip quickly, maybe we can talk further about the events that unfolded near the Bahamas. We sought to achieve our goal - to come to the aid of Cuba.

How did northern boats “feel” in tropical waters?

This question relates to the design features of those submarines that existed then. 641 project, it was the most advanced diesel submarine of the time. But it was built for northern latitudes and temperate climates. This boat was not intended for sailing in southern, tropical latitudes for many reasons... Firstly; - the temperature even at a depth of 200 meters was close to 30 degrees (not to mention surface temperatures), and the boats did not have an air conditioning system. You know what air conditioning is now - it provides complete comfort.

Secondly; - these were battery submarines. The batteries needed to be recharged regularly. The battery did not have artificial ventilation, which allowed the electrolyte to be cooled to a certain temperature. And this led to the rapid release of hydrogen, the battery boiled. 3 percent accumulation of hydrogen in the compartment is already explosive.

How long did the batteries last?

It's hard for me to remember. Each battery had specific cycles. I can't tell you the exact number. Let’s say the battery was charged for so many cycles, after which it failed. The B-130 submarine left with an insufficiently fresh battery. This also caused additional difficulties for the commander.

In addition, there were no distillation plants as such. Therefore, we had to limit the submarine personnel to fresh water. Talking about washing or shaving is out of the question. The personnel were given a glass of morning tea and a glass of evening tea. At lunch and dinner a glass of compote was given out.

How did the personnel maintain hygiene? Alcohol was given for wiping to disinfect the skin. The skin was covered with prickly heat. We were sweaty all the time, we lost a lot of weight - up to 50 percent. The body was dehydrated.

We were given clothes for the hike - blue shirts and blue shorts. Over the shoulder is a paper towel. We were sweating, and blue sweat was dripping from us, because this shirt was completely dissolving on our body. This led to purulent prickly heat. The personnel in such a terrible state were bleeding mud. And you know what you had to breathe. At a temperature of 50 - 60 degrees, especially in diesel compartments, which are already full of diesel fuel and oil vapors, temperature conditions were added.

Personnel fainted several times, especially in the diesel compartments. There were people who were unable to take a breath of fresh air during the entire 90-day trek.

In general, these were boats for operations in temperate and northern latitudes.

What mode of communication was established with the mainland. And didn't it interfere with secrecy?

Yes, not only did it interfere, but it really, really interfered - the regime that was established for us. Each submarine was assigned a subsurface schedule - this is normal (daily). In addition, the so-called collective communication session. All submarines had to surface simultaneously to receive signals, at the same time, at a set hour.

The time was set - 00.00 Moscow time. But this time in the western Atlantic corresponded to 16 hours, that is, the brightest time of day. What kind of secrecy and how was it possible for the boat to surface under such a regime? By the way, the Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Kasatonov, appealed to Moscow several times to cancel this regime. The regime remained until the end of the campaign.

Some submarines were forced to surface. How far away were the Americans?

The situation developed differently. The boat I was on was B-4. I stood on the bridge that night, the batteries were being charged, and there were tropical torrential rains. We managed to charge the battery completely.

Somewhere at dawn a strong signal appeared. Apparently they didn’t fly in this downpour. And we avoided this signal. Explosive devices rained down on us; they had a “Julie” system. They threw several depth, small bombs. The submarine was encircled by an aircraft and thrown a series of buoys with this system. The system was based on the principle of echo reflection. But we managed to withstand several bombings, three or four. Very sensitive bombs. The lights in the compartments went out. The explosions were quite sensitive to the hull. These explosions did not allow the aircraft to detect our submarine using these buoys. The radar signal detected her because she was on the surface. But we quickly left and the submarine maneuvered away from the planes for three days. They stopped the bombing. A group of anti-submarine ships appeared and gave signals with their own hydroacoustic stations. They came closer and then moved away (twice). We maneuvered in depth both along and under the jump layer, that is, in all the ways available to us. The ships did not find us. Within three days we were able to get away from both the plane and the search for a group of anti-submarine ships. They left, ran away - in short.

So you weren't discovered at all?

No, we were detected by radar, but they could not detect the submarine. But we had another case. Because of the bombing and the high temperature, the input seal in the conning tower melted and water started gushing out. The submarine was in danger of severe flooding. You can’t float to the surface, there are surface ships on top, they could get hit by a ram, and whatever you want. The submarine had to be kept at a safe depth from a ramming strike, this is somewhere more than 25 - 30 meters, and the conning tower had to be inflated with air so as not to flood the compartment. At the same time, it was necessary to eliminate the water breakthrough. Water could flood the compartment and the boat could sink.

Volunteers were found. Midshipman Kosteniuk repaired the hole, that is, he broke the oil seal and the leak was stopped. The boat was saved from sinking. For this he was nominated for the Order of the Red Star, but I don’t know if he was awarded in the future. I personally wrote the presentation. We pulled it out in this state and left with the same peach compote.

This was the situation.

Other submarines found themselves in a more difficult situation. Starting from the Azores Islands, we couldn’t stick our noses out; as soon as you raised the scope, you immediately got a signal, an airplane signal, and so on throughout the entire trip and several times during the day.

The tension subsided somewhat at night. The most dramatic events took place near the Bahamas, when submarines finally broke through these five lines, beyond their blockade line. the boats were in a very difficult situation. Fierce resistance was offered to anti-submarine forces. This is the first post-war contact, as they say, nose to nose. We met with a potential enemy. The submarine was forced to maneuver all the time, the battery was discharged, and in the end the submarine either sank to the bottom - died, or floated to the surface. But war was not declared. The submarines did not receive any instructions to use weapons; they were forced to surface surrounded by enemy ships and aircraft.

The submarines were surrounded by anti-submarine ships, up to 5 - 7, sometimes up to 10 units, they literally surrounded the submarine, as if they were putting it in a cage, and the commander had to maneuver so as not to get hit by a ram. They fired at our submarines with volleys of machine guns from aircraft. A shower of bullets was literally above the submarine itself, that is, they fired from a low altitude in this way, that is, they did not shoot at the hull, as if in front of it. The B-59 of Captain 2nd Rank Savitsky found itself in the most difficult situation; the chief of staff of the brigade, Captain 2nd Rank Arkhipov, was also on this boat.

I should note that they primarily went for a ramming attack. Shumkov, when his diesel engines failed, he surfaced. They surrounded him and went to ram him. He dived urgently and literally did not damage the hull with the screws. They could have cut him in half. But he was very well prepared, acted boldly and decisively, which allowed her to avoid a ramming attack. In general, it must be said that the Americans behaved impudently, impudently, let’s say this, they asked who, what, although it was completely clear to them. Moreover, they played music, showed unworthy, indecent places for viewing, burned, mocked our state and naval flag, burned, trampled on it, and so on, so on... . All the weapons, the entire anti-submarine weapon system was deployed to force the commanders to lose their nerve.

But there was not a single case where the nerves of the commanders could not stand it. The technology, I mean the diesel engines on one submarine, the iron could not withstand it - the people survived it, they were stronger than iron.

Did you understand that their actions were provocative?

We still see how they behave - impudence to the limit!

How did you return home?

We were returning home.

Regarding the B-36 of Captain 2nd Rank Dubivka. He was the closest, at the gate, so to speak, to Cuba. He also met with anti-submarine ships. Each boat was escorted by an aircraft carrier surrounded by up to 30 ships, 50-60 planes and helicopters. You understand that we broke through and found ourselves behind the line of their quarantine cordon.

The B-36 commander was ordered to cross the Caicos Strait, the gateway to the Bahamas, and the commander was already heading there. And literally while crossing the strait, they were ordered, like the rest of the submarines, to return to their original positions to the east and northeast. It was clear to us that we were being displaced not to Cuba, but to Cuba. After that we stayed in the area for about a month. We were then instructed to secretly return to the base. And then, as we already learned, politicians intervened in resolving the Cuban missile crisis. And this is fortunate. Despite our contribution to preventing this fire, reason still prevailed. We were in the Bahamas area for about a month. In Cuba, the evacuation of missiles and equipment took place. Then at the end of November we received an order, also secretly, to return to the base in the North.

I have already said that we managed to return safe and sound, despite the opposition of anti-submarine forces and weapons provided by the Americans, we managed to return.

One boat found itself in a difficult situation, the B-130, and ships of the Northern Fleet came to its aid. On this boat, as on all submarines, exceptional courage was shown. And I must note that after each battery charge, we found an opportunity to dive into the depths from under our noses, and again after that the search for our submarines continued. In particular, the famous American naval historian and publicist Norman Pouk describes in the magazine "Naval Collection". How they chased the B-36 submarine. Even though she left them. They searched for her for more than 3 days. The boat was forced to surface when it was discharged, in plain sight. It turns out that at this time the Americans were conducting the so-called “Presidential Hunt” for our submarines, it was called until exhaustion.

US President John Kennady was reported on the actions of the anti-submarine forces, because the operation was carried out in peacetime. Throughout the country, the US media trumpeted the successes of their anti-submarine forces and awarded them orders and medals. I already said how they chased submarines, there was no heroism. They waited for the boat to submerge, and then they watched it and waited for its battery to completely discharge and float up.

They acted, as they say, decisively, but decisively why, because they were self-confident that the nerves of the Soviet submariners would withstand. I don’t think they were happy to be forced to fire a torpedo at them, and God forbid, a nuclear one at an aircraft carrier or surface ship. Norman Pope admits it was a risk for them.

In general, the Americans believed that the Americans were completely ready to attack Cuba in order to eliminate the Castro regime. Missiles were installed on the Continent, they began to install this on October 4, and they discovered on October 16 that ballistic missiles were already sticking out under their palm trees. Along with the installation of missiles, the US government was concerned about the presence of submarines off the coast of the western Atlantic.

The military leadership was especially concerned about the presence of submarines directly off the Bahamas. Strict instructions were given to force the submarines to surface by any means necessary. October 27, 1962 was a critical moment in the life of President Kennedy related to submarines. At about 10 o'clock on the 27th, MoD McNamara reported that two Soviet transports were approaching the quarantine line and there was a submarine between them.

The President was faced with the choice of starting a war or not. That is, the match that could ignite the fire of a nuclear war could then be a submarine. There was no one there except us. Fortunately at 10.25 it was reported that the transports had stopped, the submarine was ordered to stop, and no further mention was made of the submarine. That is, if the submarine was there, then it managed to escape. Of course, they were very afraid of this. They counted 5 submarines, there were 4 of us. Moreover, they believed that all the submarines surfaced, this is not true. "Sea Collection" confirmed that it was their imagination. In short, this is the story of the presence of submarines in the Bahamas.

Who has not been in combat conditions, and for the first time had to meet head-on with a potential enemy. After all, the US anti-submarine forces were hundreds of times greater in their capabilities than the combat capabilities of our 4 boats. What are 4th boats? If in the open ocean they encountered an aircraft carrier or any ship, this would be a terrible force, and even having a nuclear warhead on board.

3 submarines were forced to surface under the influence of US anti-submarine forces, and when we arrived, each submarine was met by a commission that arrived from Moscow. That is, they greeted us gloomily. Although they were placed on the same floating base "Khalkin" in the same warm cabins, in the same beds from which the sailors went on this voyage. But even then, apparently the main goal was to place all the blame on the submarine commanders; they didn’t even want to listen to us, with the excuse that there was such a situation there. A devastating order was drawn up, which aimed to completely blame the commanders for anything and everything. True, we must pay tribute to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkov. He did not sign this order, but wrote it, which became known later when these issues became known, including to the writer Shigin. The Commander-in-Chief imposed a resolution that it was better for the submarine commander to see how to act in these conditions, and not to punish the submarine commanders. But alas, this did not end there.

At the end of December or beginning of January 1963, I was invited as a brigade commander to give a report on the actions of submarines.

Then the Military Council of the Northern Fleet listened carefully to my report on the submarine’s campaign to the Bahamas, and all submarine commanders and distinguished personnel signed award certificates with the Fleet Commander. I was nominated for the rank of rear admiral. And that was the end of it.

In January I went on vacation for last 1962. And the situation completely changed when the submarine commanders were summoned to report to the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Antonovich Grechko. It was hard to say whether it was a hearing or a scolding.

Understanding of the actions of submarine commanders from the first deputy. the Minister of Defense was not found. Submarine commanders were accused of everything. Although let’s say one of the submarine commanders understood. Moreover, Grechko believed that Gorshkov allegedly reported to him that these were not diesel submarines, but nuclear ones. Therefore, he pressed the commanders. And the commanders argued that they commanded diesel and not nuclear submarines. Then there were comments about why they didn’t throw grenades. Funny. But the commanders were accused. The conclusion was this. If I were them, I still wouldn’t surface.

And when Grechko fully realized that he was talking not with the commanders of nuclear submarines, but with the commanders of diesel submarines, who had certain capabilities to operate in the area. Then he lost interest. He quickly rolled it up and finished it. The commanders were released. Among the generals, he directly stated that if I were them, I still wouldn’t surface. In his opinion, the submarines should have sunk.

Such an opportunity quickly presented itself to the K-129 submarine, project 629 of the Pacific Fleet. Nothing was known about whose death for 25 - 30 years, everything was kept secret, families were without pensions, without any care from parents, etc. Such an unsubscribe, a message, was given. I don’t remember now whether he died or was considered dead while on duty.

You see, we returned to the base healthy, we didn’t bring back a single corpse, the submarines, although they were rusty, were restored by the end of ’63.

Somewhere in March, a scientific and practical conference was held on the stealth of submarines. I was a speaker on the submarine cruise. Where did the submarines go? I said it once. The Commander said to the whole hall: “What kind of Cuba is there, which is under Cuba. I’m not asking you which country you went to. You report on the trip that you made and broke secrecy.” that is, it turns out that the brigade commander understood less than someone who had never been there. And a completely different position. I reported to you about the Military Council, which took place in early January 1963, my report on the Cuban campaign, where my speech was received with great understanding by the members of the Military Council. Why: Because Grechko placed the burden on us, and in my opinion this burden still hangs on us, that the submarine commanders returned themselves and brought the submarines and personnel alive. If he had been in a submarine, he would have drowned.

It was carried out under this opinion expressed by Grechko.

I was accused that the only commander who does not understand what stealth submarines are is the commander of the 69th brigade, captain 2nd rank Agafonov. Everyone in the room was better aware of how to act then.

Did Fidel Castro come to you after all these events?

Before the first of May, all four submarines were built in the Severomorsk roadstead. I don't remember if there were surface ships. But one of the Project 629 submarines (missile submarine) was in our service.

We met and welcomed Fidel Castro. He was coming from the direction of Murmansk on a destroyer. We shouted "Viva Cuba". He greeted the sailors. We were extremely glad that the leader of the Cuban Revolution visited us, because we went to his aid. Having greeted us, he went ashore at the pier in Severomorsk. Soon, two B-36 submarines of captain 2nd rank Dubivko were called to the pier, Project 641, which went on a cruise and was closest to the Caicas Strait, and Project 629, which did not go to Cuba. The boats were placed this way. First, the Project 629 boat was placed at the pier, and then the B-36 was called. The missile submarine, which is larger in size, completely blocked the B-36 submarine and its commander, Captain 2nd Rank Dubivko. There they laid carpets for him on the submarine. He enjoyed lying on the sailor's bunks. And of course Fidel Castro was very pleased. I don’t know what and who reported to him, but apparently he... It’s a mystery to me why he didn’t shake hands with the commander of the K-36 boat.

On May 1, Fidel Castro stood on the podium next to Khrushchev, sparkling with the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

Some publications report that the Fleet Commander introduced the commander and that Fidel Castro shook his hand. This did not happen.

Was it offensive?

Who should I be offended by? After all, guilt, a shadow was cast on us. We understood that 3 submarines surfaced in close proximity to American anti-submarine forces.

Does Russia need a submarine fleet? Which one do you need? Why is it needed?

I think Russia has always needed a submarine fleet. And during the Great Patriotic War, the fleet showed good data and defended the Motherland. This fleet played a big role in peacetime, when a powerful atomic, nuclear fleet was created.

So that the fleet would be the same as it was during the Great Patriotic War, as it was in the years of its dawn. Russia always needs such a fleet. Because this fleet protects our country.

Laptev Valentin Alexandrovich. Ending.

“Deliver the landing force dry!”

On October 14, 1944, our troops landed from torpedo boats at the port of Liinakhamari. There are fifty Marines on board each.
“We walked through the “corridor of death” into the bay,” recalls Valentin Aleksandrovich. - The Germans fired from coastal batteries. The pier was destroyed by shells. The boatswain Zimovets and three sailors jumped from the boat into the icy water, holding the ladder in their hands. We had an order: “Deliver the landing force dry!”
Miraculously they escaped alive from the fire of German coastal batteries. One hit would have been enough for the boat.

"Goodbye little sister"

In February 1945, our boats accompanied the Onega transport to the island of Spitsbergen. “There were a lot of our girls on the transport, they were taken to work,” recalls Valentin Laptev. - A German acoustic torpedo hit the transport under the propeller. The ship came to a standstill and immediately sank to the bottom. We tried to save the drowning people, but it was useless: in the icy water they drowned almost instantly.
One of the boat sailors saw his own sister among the drowning people. This chance meeting of theirs turned out to be their last. The girl could not grab the end of the rope thrown to her.
“We, powerless to do anything, followed her with our gaze about thirty meters deep until she disappeared into the abyss,” Valentin Aleksandrovich recalls those bitter minutes.

“I don’t need your chocolate...”

The katerniki were fed well during the campaign: 100 grams of chocolate, 50 grams of butter, 70 grams of cheese, 400 grams of selected meat, 100 grams of vodka per day. But all these calories were quickly blown away by the icy wind.
“Pavel Borodulin, the gunner from the floating base, was very jealous of us,” recalls Valentin Laptev. - I also dreamed of eating chocolate every day. He persuaded the command to transfer him to a boat. He went to sea with us once and ran back: “I don’t need your chocolate, I want to live!” We were just using depth charges to jam a German boat. The boat crackled with every explosion behind the stern.

A quarter died in battle

In April 1945, the boat commander ordered Valentin Laptev: “Run to the brigade club!”
“The hall is full of people, suddenly I hear my name,” says Valentin Aleksandrovich. - I don’t remember how I walked to the podium, I heard the commander of the fleet, Admiral Golovko, telling me something. I ran onto the boat - “Well?” they asked, I unclenched my fist - the Order of the Red Star.

And then there were another five years of service on boats in the cold northern seas. He left home as a boy and returned as a man, tempered by war, the sea and the North.
Of the 1,200 Gorky residents who became cabin boys at the end of the war, a quarter died in battle, many later died from wounds or their consequences. Of those who survived, almost all connected their lives with the fleet, many became senior officers, and several became admirals.
“And now there are only fifty-nine of us,” said Valentin Laptev, chairman of the Nizhny Novgorod branch of the All-Russian Council of Navy Young Men.

Leonov Vitaly Viktorovich

Our cabin boys drank through three years of war,
For three years the boys grew up in battles,
The waves of the sea have closed over many,
They became anchors for eternity...

These lines belong to Vitaly Leonov - during the Great Patriotic War, a cabin boy of the Northern Fleet, in the peaceful post-war days - a film artist, unfortunately, now deceased. The poems were born in 1972, on the day of the opening on the Solovetsky Islands of a monument to northern cabin boys who died in naval battles with the Nazis. - Boys with bows

Performer of episodic roles in the films “White Bim Black Ear”, “Sibiriyada”, “They Fought for the Motherland”, “Fairy Tale”, “While the Clock Strikes”, “Promised Heaven”, “About Businessman Thomas”. He played village peasants or various kinds of artisans.
Vitaly Leonov came to cinema as an amateur. He graduated from the studio at the Northern Fleet Theater and subsequently became a freelance actor at the Film Actor's Studio Theatre, where he performed in small roles and crowd scenes.
Leonov's appearance did not suit him for the roles of heroes or production leaders; the actor was used mainly in comedies or war films. He played drunkards, hard workers, rogues, robbers, soldiers - ours, and Germans...

"The boy was called Captain" (1973)

"Conscience" (1974)

"We didn't go through this" (1975)

"Days of Surgeon Mishkin" (1976)

"Eternal Call" (1973-1983)

"The investigation is being conducted by Experts. Case No. 13. Until the third shot." (1978)

Leontyev Alexey

"Yungi from the Urals." - Youth scorched by war. Authors of the project: young military correspondents of the Voskhozhdenie PDC - Vladimir Ilyinykh, Alexey Baklanov.

There are young street children in the Southern Urals, but there are no problems with them. Moscow street children. If you meet, do not try to make contact. What kind of “war” scorched them? A rhetorical question.

From the memoirs of Alexey Leontyev, Solovetsky cabin boy of the 1st set:

To be continued.

Address to graduates of Nakhimov schools. Dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the formation of the Nakhimov School, the 60th anniversary of the first graduates of the Tbilisi, Riga and Leningrad Nakhimov Schools.

Please do not forget to inform your classmates about the existence of our blog dedicated to the history of the Nakhimov schools and about the appearance of new publications.